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Ethnic gang violence is often depicted as a clash between criminals pursuing 
instrumental advantage, and also as a clash of  ideological fanatics pursuing 
collective nationalist, ethnolinguistic or ethnoreligious rights. However, 
there is an apparent tension between the conceptualization of such violence 
as the rational self-interest of deprived individuals, and  as the irrational 
fanaticism of anomic communities. The examination of one particular ethnic 
gang, the Betawi Brotherhood Forum which operates in Jakarta, Indonesia, 
indicates how both dimensions of violence coexist and interweave. The 
apparent analytical tension between individualistic pragmatism and 
collectivist moral absolutism is resolved by showing how the gang responds 
to their disillusionment with the state by constructing for themselves a ‘state 
proxy’ role. This response is portrayed as based upon ‘ressentiment’ – the 
‘faulty rationality’ which marginalized individuals  adopt so as to translate 
their clashes of material self interests into the moral conflict between 









The global incidence of violence between members of different linguistic, racial or 
religious groups (ethnicized violence1), has prompted various attempts at explanation. 
This paper looks at one site of such violence, involving the gang fighting which has 
intensified in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto in 1998. Such violence has become 
rampant in various urban areas of Indonesia, with gangs armed with machetes 
attacking property, each other, and members of ‘victim’ communities, resulting in 
numerous deaths.  The focus here is on one gang in Indonesia, the Betawi 
Brotherhood Forum (FBR) of Jakarta, whose members are impelled to violence by the 
belief that their individual self-aggrandizement constitutes a collectivist ethnic right. 
It is this interplay between instrumentalism and ideology which constitutes the focus 
of the paper. 2 
There have been numerous studies of ethnicized violence in post-Suharto 
Indonesia, focusing on various sites of conflict, notably the separatist disputes in East 
Timor, Aceh and West Papua, Muslim-Christian rioting in the Moluccas and 
Sulewesi, inter-ethnic violence in Kalimantan, anti-Chinese violence, and the violent 
behavior of Muslim paramilitary groups and youth gangs.3 These studies vary as to 
their depictions of ethnicized violence. Some have focused primarily on its cultural 
and historical roots; some on the role of economic disparities; and others on the 
political role of the state as the agency of patrimonial or coercive oppression.4   
Several such studies have noted that New Order actors have continued to play a role 
in promoting violence towards targets identified in part on an ethnic basis.5 
While descriptive studies  often incorporate diverse approaches, there has 
nevertheless been a recent trend towards emphasizing the instrumentalist basis for 
violence, seeing it as arising primarily from the pragmatic struggle for  material 
resources, with the analysis often focusing upon the manipulative behavior of political 
and economic elites.6  When, however, attention has focused on the motives of 
followers, analysis often shifts to the mobilization of communal loyalties portrayed 
more as cultural givens than as rational choices.7 
This literature on ethnicized violence in Indonesia aims primarily to offer rich 
descriptions of particular cases rather than to apply or develop particular theories,8 so 
that the conceptual relationship between these two aspects of violence- as a clash of 
material self-interests and as a clash of  communal loyalties - is rarely carefully 
examined. If ethnicized violence were to be depicted as an attempt to resolve material 
deprivation, then the perpetrators could be portrayed as egoistic criminals motivated 
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to group violence through a pragmatic and instrumentally rational calculation to 
maximize their access to scarce resources. If, on the other hand, the violence were 
seen to arise out of an irrational retreat from anomic dislocations into absolutist 
loyalties to cultural communities, then the perpetrators could be depicted as 
ideological fanatics. However, the intermixing of these two facets of violence in the 
accounts offered by many descriptive studies, is made conceptually problematical by 
the polarities employed to construct the two divergent depictions – deprivation or 
dislocation, individualistic or collectivist, rational or irrational, amoral or moralistic, 
pragmatic or ideological.  The question arises as to how one is to explain the 
intermixing of these two types of factor and motivation, in the same situation, the 
same gang, or even the same individual. 
The explanation which follows relates to one case of ethnic gang violence, and 
it is recognized that the interplay of instrumental and ideological elements might 
differ in cases of ethnic riots or ethnic separatism. Nevertheless, this study has broad 
applicability in illuminating contemporary debate between the two strands of 
argument. The purpose is to indicate how the two causal factors (deprivation and 
dislocation) might derive from a common situation; and how the two characterizations 
of the perpetrators (as pragmatic criminal and as ideological fanatic) might constitute 
compatible manifestations of a common response to that situation.    The argument 
developed here, is that the two facets of ethnicized violence derive from particular 
forms of disillusionment with the state, and from a ‘faulty rationality’ response to that 
disillusionment. 
 
Aspects of ethnicized violence in post-Suharto Indonesia: 
(a)Violence as instrumental pragmatism 
Violence has frequently been explained as arising out of “rational quarrels over the 
distribution of resources”.9 In Indonesia, the state under Suharto functioned as the 
patrimonial center of a patron-client network, distributing patronage to clients in 
return for their political support. Access to resources thus depended significantly upon 
personalized relationships, extending ‘from village to palace’, through which clients 
could hope to ‘buy’ resources in return for their loyalty to individual patrons linked to 
the various arms and levels of the state, who could then employ this loyalty to 
advantage in their elite rivalries.  The fact that this personalistic and patrimonial 
system relied upon corruption and nepotism meant that the resultant distribution of 
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resources was never effectively institutionalized, and left various sections of society 
exploited or marginalized. It thus did not provide a very effective basis for 
Indonesia’s political integration. Nevertheless, it retained some stability and 
predictability so long as Suharto’s New Order regime functioned as the focal source 
of patronage. The fall of Suharto, the weak governments that followed, and the 
chaotic implementation of administrative decentralization measures, all contributed to 
the disruption of patron-client linkages, and thence to increased unpredictability in the 
contention for resources. Marginalized groups sought new patronage openings from 
the ‘fiefdoms’ which emerged at various levels of the bureaucracy. When resource 
deprivations were intensified by Indonesia’s post-1997 economic slump, and when 
economic disparities were further exacerbated by neo-liberal policies, various groups 
in Indonesia began to experience downward social mobility and material deprivation. 
Contention for patronage thus became increasingly predatory, unpredictable and 
violent.10  
Those patronage networks that had hitherto relied on access to state resources, 
but now found themselves marginalized or excluded, began to seek new means to 
access resources.11  Those who had recourse to egoistic criminality in order to access 
scarce resources, sometimes found it advantageous to organize into ethnic gangs, so 
as to generate resources through theft, or through ‘protection racket’ violence.12  Such 
ethnic gangs were essentially instrumentalist groupings whose shared cultural norms 
and territorial contiguity facilitated their development as interactive socio-economic 
networks. Ethnicized violence could thus be seen as a rational response by those 
suffering material deprivation, where the state had weakened in the sense of failing to 
provide effective channels of access to patronage resources.  In Jacques Bertrand’s 
recent study, for example, he explains ethnic violence in Indonesia as arising from the 
ways in which state institutions have favored some ethnic groups over others, thus 
generating grievances relating to economic discrimination or disadvantage, denial of 
political rights or representation, or cultural discrimination. “Whether grievances are 
based on economic, political, or cultural conditions and comparisons, the likelihood of 
violence increases when significant changes lead to worsened conditions for 





(b) Violence as ethnic absolutism 
Violence is sometimes depicted as arising from an upsurge of anger or aggression that 
has its origin, not in material deprivation, but in a feeling of powerlessness, alienation 
or humiliation. Such feelings might in some cases accompany material deprivation, 
but might arise independently, and are analytically distinct. This can provide a basis 
for explaining ethnicized violence when the feelings of powerlessness are seen to 
derive from the type of social conditions denoted by Durkheim as ‘anomic’ – 
situations in which social dislocation coincides with the development of a dissonance 
between the moral norms of equal citizenship embodied in public discourse, and the 
barriers to social mobility embodied in day-to-day experience. As Liah Greenfeld has 
recently explained, it is particularly the dissonance between the promises offered in 
the language of civic nationalism, of equal citizenship and popular sovereignty; and 
the social realities of entrenched civic impotence and inequity, which generate 
anomie.14   
This might trigger various responses, including a retreat into apathetic loss of 
will, or outbursts of social deviance; but one possibility which is frequently alluded to 
in the literature on ethnic conflict, is that it triggers a ‘crisis of identity’ which leads 
individuals under stress to ‘revert’ to an instinctual identification with ‘the primordial 
tribe’. Instead of individual identity being experienced as multiple affiliations with 
diverse ethnic or other collectivities, security is sought in intensified ‘herd 
conformity’ with a single community of cultural sameness; and in a belief in the 
moral certainties of its collective values. As Huntington put it in his discussion of the 
cultural and religious resurgence underlying the global ‘clash of civilizations’,  
“modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and 
social relations are broken, and leads to crises of identity to which religion provides 
an answer.”15  
In the Indonesian case, the anomie that might underlie ethnicized violence has 
several sources, including the dislocations of communities and authority structures 
associated with modernization and globalization. State interventions in society have 
also contributed to social disruptions both through the impact of political 
centralization and national integration policies, but also through the destabilizing 
impact upon diverse communities and patron-client networks, of governmental 
corruption, inefficiency, arbitrariness and instability. The resultant social discontent 
was manifested in the intense political mobilization of the post-1997 ‘reformasi’ 
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period.16 The promises of political activists at that time, of an imminent transition to 
justice and good governance, clashed with the social realities of resurgent patrimonial 
corruption, entrenched civic impotence and social inequality. This anomic dissonance 
was endemic.  As Max Lane quoted from a 1997 interview:   
 
The urban poor... read the penny novels of Freddy S and the Chinese fighting 
stories of Wiro Sableng and Kho Ping Ho which teach of the holiness of pure 
love and that those who struggle for justice and truth are always victorious, 
always survive ... (They) are more aware of the contradictions around them 
because in their daily lives the rich pass back and forth before their very 
eyes. They experience all kinds of criminality, including the criminal actions 
of the government and the violence and arrogance of the military in the form 
of extortion, bribes and beatings.17 
 
If some individuals do seek release from anomic dissonance by intensifying their 
identification with the ethnic community, the danger is clearly that the anomic 
insecurity is merely transferred from the individual to the ethnic collectivity; so that 
the ethnic community becomes the ‘bent twig’18 which lashes out violently to protect 
its formulaic collective rights. This is particularly likely when, as in Indonesia, the 
state has legitimated itself as the guarantor of inter-ethnic harmony, promising ‘unity 
in diversity’ but lacking the capacity to deliver such ethnic security.   From this 
perspective, the fundamental cause of ethnic conflict in Indonesia would appear to be 
“an erosion of belief in the nation-state as the unquestioned given of modern politics” 
so that “people seek other sources of community” in “nationhood, ethnicity and 
religion”. Violence follows when such attachments become “a label separating Us 
from Them.”19 
This sketch of the two strands of argument indicates their divergence. Both 
interpretations have been applied to the gangs and paramilitary-style groups which 
have proliferated in Indonesia in recent years. They have been widely portrayed as 
criminal gangs employing violence for purposes of extortion and intimidation, in the 
unprincipled pursuit of money, jobs or contracts. However they are also depicted as 
the vigilante arms of ethnic, religious or nationalist movements, imbued with 
absolutist notions of collective injustice and collective rights.20  The apparent tension 
between these two facets of the gangs has most often been resolved by the assumption 
that the reality of self-interested pragmatic criminality is being camouflaged and 
manipulatively rationalized by the pretence of commitment to the moral ethnic or 
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religious community.  Alternatively, the tension is sometimes resolved by depicting 
the gangs as organizations of ethnic or religious militants who seek their recruits from 
individualistic delinquents, in order to convert them into defenders of collectivist 
virtue, while sometimes failing in this conversion enterprise. They therefore have to 
repeatedly weed out unconverted ‘rogue elements’ (oknum).21  However, in order to 
decide whether both depictions can be coherently accommodated, we need to look 
more closely at the gangs. 
 
INDONESIAN GANG VIOLENCE 
Gang violence is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. The local ‘strong man’, known 
under a variety of names such as jago, jawara, bajingan and more recently preman is 
the product of a widespread culture which emphasizes masculinity, martial arts and 
supernatural powers. Politically they have been central yet ambiguous figures 
throughout the history of the archipelago from the colonial period to the present.22  
While to their local community the jawara (‘champions’) might be virtuous protectors 
and charismatic leaders, to others they were ruthless predators and bandits. In 
contemporary Indonesia the designation of jawara implies a link to traditional 
morality and martial prowess, whilst ‘preman’ implies criminality.23  A pattern has 
continued throughout Indonesian history whereby rulers and power holders have 
maintained a symbiotic relationship with criminals and gangs, occasionally employing 
state violence against them, but also co-opting them.24  Gangs of bandits and jawara, 
known as gerombolan, were central in the struggle against Dutch colonial rule, along 
with youths who joined irregular militias, known as laskyar.25 These gangs and 
militias were recruited by the nationalists but often also pursued their own interests. 
After decolonization, some were recruited into the new Indonesian National Army, 
but many more found themselves with no recognition for their role in the revolution, 
and turned  to make a living from extortion and kidnapping.  
The beginning of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime saw a situation similar to the 
post-revolution period. Youths who had been mobilized by the military against 
suspected communists and leftists during 1965-66 returned to everyday life to find 
themselves unemployed and with scant prospects. Criminal gangs soon threatened to 
undermine the new regime’s claim that it was a restorer of political and social 
stability. The response by the New Order was a two-pronged strategy of cooptation 
and coercion.  In 1973 General Soemitro, head of the Command for the Restoration of 
 8
Security and Public Order (Kopkamtib) ordered the disbanding of all “groups and 
gangs of teenagers.”26 In the same year the state formed the Indonesian National 
Youth Committee (KNPI) as the sole forum for youth organizations in Indonesia. A 
sub-committee of this, the State Intelligence Agency (BAKIN) assembled former 
gang leaders for training as mechanics, and throughout the country local military 
commanders established various ‘teen clubs’ that usually emphasized sport.27 The 
effect was to reconstruct ‘preman’ under the more palatable mantle of ‘youth’, and to 
mobilize them for the suppression of dissent and other ‘regime maintenance chores’.   
But their subsequent elimination by the state was also central to the New 
Order’s construction of itself as the guardian of social and political security in the face 
of an ever-present threat of anarchy and lawlessness.28  Periodic purges were directed 
primarily at petty criminals, who were summarily executed by government hit squads; 
as in the mysterious Petrus shootings of 1982-3 which resulted in several thousand 
deaths29. The killings sent panic through the preman world, and resulted in many 
joining state-backed groups such as the Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancasila).  
 The end of the New Order was characterized by the unraveling of the strong 
centralized state, but not of the culture of violence and intimidation. Decentralization 
reforms first implemented in 1999 devolved political and fiscal power from Jakarta to 
the provinces and then to district and sub-district levels. One impact was the 
reinvigoration and politicization of localized ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious 
identities, which could now be employed as a basis for seeking resource or status 
advancement. In 1999 Habibie revoked the New Order regulation of asas tunggal 
which had required all social and community organizations to adopt the state ideology 
of the Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation.  The asas tunggal was an 
instrument which had allowed the New Order to suppress ethnic and religious 
organizations by depicting them as the SARA affiliations of tribe, religion, race and 
class (suku, agama, ras antar golongan) which threatened national unity. The lifting 
of the asas tunggal opened the flood gates for ethnic and religious groups and 
organizations which had felt aggrieved by the New Order’s suppression, and sought 
recompense.  
In the social upheaval following Suharto’s resignations, the military 
encouraged the formation of pamswkarsa (self-help) civilian security forces, 
including largely Islamic vigilante and paramilitary groups that were mobilized in a 
failed attempt to curtail student demonstrations against President Habibie. While older 
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state-sponsored preman-based organizations such as the Pemuda Pancasila and 
Pancamarga Youth  (Pemuda Pancamarga) continued to depict themselves as 
defenders of national unity, the new preman groups were organized almost 
exclusively along ‘post-Pancasila’ ethnic and religious lines.  Many of these new 
gangs were thus not merely criminal youths seeking material benefits; they were also 
often marginalized ethnic communities seeking collective rights.30  It seems likely 
that both facets of ethnicized violence can offer partial illuminations of these 
ethnicized gangs, but if this is so, how are we to conceptualize their intertwining?   
 
THE BETAWI BROTHERHOOD FORUM 
The Betawi Brotherhood Forum (FBR) first emerged in July 2001 in the wake of a 
series of violent incidents between Betawi and Maduranese in East Jakarta.31 Led by 
Fadloli el-Muhir, an Islamic preacher, a former journalist and a politician within the 
Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, or PDI), the FBR claims 
to represent the interests of Jakarta’s ethnic Betawi, widely portrayed as the 
indigenous population of Jakarta.32  The Betawi comprise about 27% of Jakarta’s 
population, numbering about 2.7 million, and clustered primarily in Eastern and 
Central Jakarta.33 The FBR is one of several Betawi organizations, but has been one 
of the most active and successful, both in membership terms, and in terms of the 
acquisition of power.  In the words of the organization, its purpose is: 
To act as a vehicle through which to struggle for the rights of the Betawi 
community, which till now have been oppressed, both structurally as well as 
culturally, so that they may become ‘the real owner of the island’ 34 
After the end of the New Order the number of Betawi organizations increased from 20 
to over 70, most of  which  were affiliated with the umbrella association, the Betawi 
Consultative Body, (Badan Musyawarah Betawi, or Bamus).35 The FBR distinguished 
itself from other Betawi organizations by its focus upon recruiting from amongst the 
urban poor and unemployed. This strategy has been very successful. Since FBR’s 
inception in 2001 its membership has grown to around 80-100,000, spread throughout 
the greater Jakarta area. Almost all of FBR’s members are males aged between 20 and 
40 years old, 50% of whom are unemployed. The FBR thus proclaims itself as a voice 
for the most marginalized and disenfranchised Betawi. It initially rejected Bamus as 
an organization concerned only for “elite Betawi”.36  
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According to the FBR, the Betawi have been oppressed in their own 
homeland, and have failed to benefit from either the economic development 
(pembangunan) of the New Order, or the process of democratization following its 
demise. FBR’s answer is the assertion that only through predatory behavior will 
Betawi get ahead in society. In order to achieve their goal the FBR have undertaken a 
strategy of claiming their economic and political rights through the use of coercion, 
intimidation and force. The FBR is thus organized on quasi-military lines. Its 
extensive network of security posts (gardu) mirrors the army’s territorial command 
structure. Uniforms and military-style insignia are used. It has various ‘troops’, with 
training in martial arts and techniques believed to confer supernatural powers. At the 
gardu security post level these troops are referred to as Pitung,  and are under the 
command of a pendekar, a title derived from martial arts culture of pencak silat, who 
in turn is under the authority at the district level of the jawara, the highest title 
conferred within the organization.37  The organizations ubiquitous slogan is the call 
“to become jawara in their own neighborhood”.  
Interviews with gang members, and observations of their activities, make it 
clear that belief in the wrongs done to the Betawi ethno-religious community, in the 
justice of its claims, and in the need to defend the homeland autonomy of the Betawi  
against those who would invade it, coexist with the concern of individual gang 
members to use violence and intimidation in order to enrich themselves. FBR’s 
charismatic leader, Fadloli el-Muhir embodies these contradictions, being religious 
teacher and scholar, politician, presidential advisor, ethnic gang leader and vigilante. 
Gang members do vary, with some apparently motivated primarily by Islamic pietism, 
others more by an ethnic xenophobia, and others primarily by an overt concern for 
individual self-aggrandizement.  But discussions with gang members move easily 
between the three themes without any sense of apparent contradiction or tension, as is 
evident in the following series of response from a group asked why they were 
involved in the FBR: 
One (young gang member) simply rubbed his stomach and said “to fill my 
stomach”. The others laughed but then responded more earnestly; “Yes, its 
true, most of us have only finished primary school, how else can we get by?” 
“My friends joined, so I did the same. We stick together”. “FBR unifies us 
(unemployed young men) so that we can become a power”. “It improves the 
welfare of the Betawi”.38     
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THE INTERTWINING OF PRAGMATISM AND IDEOLOGY 
In order to explain this, and to examine the interplay between deprivation and 
dislocation as bases for gang violence, we need to revise the two characterizations of 
ethnicized violence that have been sketched, so as to reformulate the argument.  The 
explanation is in two parts. Firstly, it is suggested that the perpetrators of violence 
have experienced a disillusionment with the state which has both a material and a 
moral dimension - a loss of faith in the state’s ability to deliver economic patronage; 
and a loss of faith in its capacity to promote the development of the national 
community.   Secondly, it is suggested that this dual disillusionment with the state 
generates a ressentiment mentality in which instrumental calculations of self-interest 
and ideological perceptions of  communal rights, are reconciled. 39. 
The Indonesian government of Sukarno had sought legitimacy through its 
claim to embody a national unity forged through the anti-colonial struggle against 
Dutch and then Japanese rule. The Suharto regime had then legitimated itself through 
its overthrow of Sukarno, and then its capacity to provide political stability and 
economic development. Nevertheless, the apparent pragmatism of Suharto’s New 
Order was modified by its portrayal of the national development project as progress 
towards a nation frequently idealized in civic, and indeed in democratic egalitarian, 
terms. To a significant extent therefore, the cohesion of the Indonesian nation-state 
became  dependent upon ethnic and regional tensions being ‘buffered’ by  the 
regime’s attempts to sustain this belief in the possibility of civic nationalist progress. 
Whenever government policies and practices  fell short of the civic nationalist ideals 
of equal citizenship, popular sovereignty and equitable economic development, 
Suharto sought  to justify those policies and practices as the contemporary sacrifices 
necessary for Indonesia’s eventual attainment of civic developmental goals. This civic 
buffer was never very strong however, and had to be repeatedly supplemented by 
inducements of patrimonial self-interests, and by the coercive constraints of 
authoritarian rule. 
The violent, corrupt and exploitative behavior of the Suharto regime 
progressively  undermined this civic nationalist faith in the Indonesian state40, so that 
many Indonesians lost pride in Indonesian identity, and began to believe that the 
Indonesian state could never deliver peaceful progress.  The removal of Suharto in 
1998 saw a brief upsurge in civic optimism, - that the patrimonial inequalities and 
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inequities could now be replaced by the rule of law, by democracy, and by egalitarian 
citizenship.  The reality, however, was that access to government patronage now 
became increasingly uncertain, with the result that elite rivalries intensified and 
aspiring elites began searching for new routes to access resources. 
Disillusionment with the state thus can be seen to have had two sources; 
firstly, the reduced flow of state patronage to some sections of society; and secondly, 
the decline in faith in the state’s capacity to promote the integration and development 
of the nation.  
This dual disillusionment with the state was experienced by Betawi residents 
of  Jakarta, as a perception that they were missing out on the urban development of 
Jakarta because of their marginalization from the main Javanese-focused patronage 
networks associated with the various arms of government; that there was an erosion of 
social cohesion at their local community level; and that this formed part of a wider 
decline in Indonesia’s national integration. These perceptions contributed to a 
growing sense of isolation and abandonment, and thence to the search for new sources 
of resources, community, and authority.41  As Lake and Rothchild have noted, it is the  
loss of faith in a secure future - the fear that the state might fail to protect the ethnic 
community - which leads such groups to begin acting “as if the state were in fact 
weak.”42 
 
If the government fulfilled its obligations and provided us with work, and 
satisfied our basic needs, then there would be no reason for FBR to exist. As 
it stands, if we don’t stand up and fight for what is rightfully ours, we will 
end up with nothing.43 
 
THE ‘RESSENTIMENT’ RESPONSE 
Feelings of marginalization do not necessarily generate violence. In order to examine 
the process whereby they might in some situations do so, we need to indicate in 
general terms how the ressentiment argument might be developed and applied 
Marginalization may derive from cultural, economic or political origins, but it 
is experienced both in the material deprivation of the marginalized communities, and 
in the disruption of their authority structures.  Thus the response of those who feel 
marginalized  involves their attempt to make sense of  the relationship between their 
economic deprivation and their loss of social cohesion. It has been suggested that, in 
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such circumstances, some activists in marginalized communities may begin to act on 
the basis of emotions which, while initially performing instrumentalist functions, can 
develop in less rational directions. To employ Hobbesean terminology, it is the 
intensity of anxiety about the future, and the ignorance about causes, which leads 
people to search for some source of good and evil -  ‘the gods were at first created by 
human fear,’ In Roger Peterson’s formulation, fear and hatred directed at the 
rectification of wrongs, can develop into a diffuse rage and thence into a resentment 
directed against an ethnic group which might not be the initial object of the fear and 
hatred, but which “can be most surely subordinated through violence”.44 This non-
rational element is most dramatically indicated by the concept of ressentiment,45 
which provides a framework for the understanding of violence which combines 
rational and non-rational, instrumental and ideological, aspects. This intertwining can 
be initially sketched as a logic of  identity-construction, before illustrating how some 
elements of it have been manifested in the case of the  FBR.  
 
(a) The colonial mentality: 
A widespread first response amongst those who are marginalized, and are powerless 
to rectify this, is the development of  what has been termed a ‘colonial mentality’; the 
resignation of the marginalized, and the acceptance that their culture must be inferior. 
The corollary of this is the development of feelings of admiration and envy directed 
towards the culture of the dominant groups.46  
 
(b) The hatred of the exploiters: 
Some amongst the marginalized minority come to perceive that their social disruption 
and feelings of relative deprivation derive, not from complex social forces, but from 
the oppression of the minority community by the state. Thus for example, even if the 
economic deprivation of a minority community derived primarily from the poverty of 
its economic resources, it is likely to be perceived by some ethnic minority elites as  
arising from the ‘internal colonialist’ functioning of the state. 
 
(c) The illusion of the virtue of the victims: 
The inability of the marginalized minority to act on this perception, and defeat the 
state, leads to a reformulation.47 They experience a growing dissonance between 
traditional values and the egalitarian rhetoric of state nationalism; and also between 
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both of these and the social realities of their disruption and marginalization. One 
solution for this anomic dissonance is ressentiment. In the ressentiment process, 
shame of the ‘defeated’ culture of the minority, is replaced by its depiction as a 
virtuous culture characterized by purity, asceticism and communitarian spirit. By 
contrast, the envy of the dominant culture gives way to disdain, and its depiction as 
immoral - materialistic, decadent and corrupt. This ressentiment reformulation 
involves an element of illusion which enables those who are marginalized and 
deprived to once more feel good about themselves; “one can feel happy and superior 
to the poor individuals who possess the now devalued and ridiculed values” of the 
dominant culture.48 
The core evidence of the corruption of the dominant culture, and of the state, 
is of course, the contempt which the dominant culture displays for the minority 
culture, and thence the failure of the state to grant the minority cultural community its 
fair share of  power and resources.  It is important to note that this stereotyping of the 
dominant culture, and of the state, as corrupt by virtue of its disdain for the virtuous 
Us, carries with it the possibility of a reversal - that if a member of the dominant 
community, or of the state-elite, were to ‘step outside’ this stereotype and grant 
respect to the minority culture by recognizing its authenticity and validating its 
claims, then they might thereby move from the category of those to be disdained and 
opposed, into the category of those with whom alliance is possible. This means that 
shifts of political strategy on the part of the oppressed, which might appear either as 
pragmatic instrumentalism or as evidence of anomic instability, can be seen to exhibit 
an ideological consistency. 
 
(d) The ethnic stereotyping of the Us: 
The illusory reconstruction of the minority Us as a virtuous cultural community, takes 
the form of a thickening of ethnic identity which provides the ‘victims’ with a sense 
of moral and cognitive certainty, a sense of belonging, predictability and security. It is 
clear why it is ethnicity which tends to become the dominant focus for this absolutist 
collective stereotyping of the Us. The notion that the religious or linguistic group, 
within which many of ones’ interactions occur, comprises a kinship community – a  
‘family’ with its own ancestral homeland - offers security both by defining the 
traditional culture of the group as the culture of ancestral virtue, and also by evoking 
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the idea of an idealized past, of the ethnic Us secure in our own ancestral homeland, 
which has now been disrupted. 
 
(e) The ethnic  stereotyping of the Other: 
This illusory reconstruction of the Us as virtuous ethnic victims, is always vulnerable 
to a revival of awareness that the culture of the Us is indeed inferior, characterized by 
its own materialism, decadence and corruption. The ressentiment ideology sustains 
the illusory sense of self-worth against such doubts, by displacing the negative 
attributes of the Us on to an ethnically stereotyped Other. This ideological strategy is 
particularly necessary for demarcating the Us from those others who are similar in 
their political marginalization and in their cultural attributes. In order to prevent the 
corrupt or materialist elements in their culture holding a mirror up to similar elements 
in the culture of the Us, they are constructed as the demonized opposite to the 
sanctified us. The portrayal of this Other as the ethnic enemy, and thence as the target 
of violence, means that the sense of impotence generated by the failure to confront the 
dominant state, can be replaced by a new sense of cultural and political potency, thus 
further promoting the sense of self-worth which ressentiment generates. The targeting 
of the marginalized Other is not simply an instrumentally rational attack against a 
vulnerable rival for resources; nor is it merely the irrational scapegoating of a weak 
but accessible innocent; rather it is an ideological ethnic stereotyping of those whose  
closeness  in social position, physical proximity, and similarity of cultural attributes, 
most threatens the illusory sanctification of the Us. Once they are demonized as the 
threatening ethnic Other, their participation as rivals in the struggle for scarce 
resources can be portrayed as the invasion of the collective rights of the ethnic  Us. 
 
(f) The ethnic nationalist ideology of homeland invasion: 
The complexities of politics thus become simplified, in the language of ressentiment 
ethnic nationalism, into a ‘good Us versus evil Other’ formula.  The result is a 
powerful ethnic ideology offering a simple diagnosis for contemporary problems and 
a simple prescription for their resolution - ‘Once we were cohesive and secure. Things 
went wrong when our homeland was infected or invaded by the Others who usurped 
our legitimate rights.  If  this usurpation can be rectified by  restoring the autonomy of 
our ethnic homeland, then we will once again be cohesive and secure’.  
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Such a formulation becomes a self-validating cognitive and moral filter, since 
diverse contemporary grievances can be portrayed as arising from disruptive 
usurpations of the ethnic homeland by the demonized Other. This can be constantly 
validated by the exaggeration of the usurpations committed by the ethnic Other. The 
focus on the victimization of the community demonstrates to skeptical, apathetic or 
collaborationist elements, that there is no alternative to ethnic nationalist mobilization. 
The ressentiment process thus generates a similar “faulty reasoning and magnification 
of danger” to that outlined by Horowitz in his examination of the ‘calculus’ 
underlying ethnic riots.49  The outline of this process in the case of the FBR indicates 
how it serves to resolve the disillusionment with the state. 
 
THE RECONSTRUCTION AND SANCTIFICATION  OF BETAWI ETHNIC 
IDENTITY 
The Betawi are believed to have emerged out of the intermixing of various ethnic 
groups brought to Batavia, now Jakarta, from the 17th century onwards, to act as 
slaves, servants and soldiers for the Dutch colonial authorities.50  Fearful that 
Javanese would conspire to revolt, the Dutch sought ethnic groups far from mainland 
Java, mainly from Bali, Ambon and the Moluccas, but also from other parts of South 
and Southeast Asia. The end of the slave trade and the abandonment of the Dutch 
policy of administering Batavia’s population along ethnic lines, resulted in greater 
intermixing. The resultant interactions amongst this marginalized and powerless 
section of Batavian society, led to the development of a distinctive ethnic culture 
which was self-consciously urban and egalitarian. Without the traditional aristocracy 
of the Sundanese, Balinese and Javanese, Betawi culture and society remains 
distinctly working class.  The word Betawi itself has a colonial legacy, being derived 
from ‘Batavia’.   
Their mixed ancestry. their migrant status, and their origins as a product of 
colonial rule, meant that the Betawi were initially not treated as ethnically authentic 
by Suharto’s  ‘New Order’ regime, in its program of cultural engineering.51  
Moreover, although the recent decentralization measures have seen indigenous 
populations gain access to local power, and to an improved standard of living, this has 
not been the case in the nation’s capital. The result has been the growing perception 
amongst the disillusioned Betawi that, in the words of Fadloli, “while Indonesia has 
 17
been independent for over 60 years, the Betawi have yet to experience independence 
in their own land” 52 
Their experiences of marginalization in Jakarta, and their ressentiment 
responses to this marginalization, have led them to reconstruct Betawi identity so as to 
refute these ambiguities of ethnic authenticity, and to assert their cultural virtue. 
Individual gang members experience this as a shift from a low sense of self-worth to a 
new sense of esteem: 
Before (joining FBR) people just considered us trouble-makers and no-one 
would give us jobs. Now we are respected in the community. People look up 
to us and come to us for help, whether it’s a dispute or because they want to 
learn about Betawi custom.53 
What we have done since the end of the New Order is to lift up our heads, 
not stay stooped over or allow ourselves to be used politically. With the FBR 
we are taking pride in being Betawi and taking real steps to improve our 
conditions.54 
In order to make this transition, the gang members have redefined Betawi identity as 
an indigenous ethnic community residing in its own territorial homeland, rather than 
as migrants; they have identified ancestral heroes who embody the required Betawi 
virtues; and they have portrayed their working class culture of urban materialism and 
sensuality, as one characterized by  religious asceticism. 
The FBR deny the accusation that they are a preman gang, and assert the 
purity of Betawi culture in contrast to the corruption of the wider society. 55  They 
construct Betawi identity by employing the symbolism and  mythology associated 
with cultural heroes such as the Robin Hood-like Si Pitung. Pitung is depicted as the 
quintessential jawara, both an outlaw and a figure of respect and influence amongst 
the community,  who according to legend stole from the colonial and indigenous elite 
and distributed the spoils amongst the poor. While his actions were in the eyes of the 
authorities ‘criminal’ they were believed by the Betawi to be motivated by an 
unwavering pursuit of justice: martial prowess combined with religious knowledge 
and charismatic leadership.56 
The ethnic culture of the Betawi, which includes elements of secularity and 
sensuality typical of urban working-class societies, is reconstructed in FBR ideology, 
so as to be portrayed in terms of Quranic purity. FBR meetings juxtapose the display 
of Islamic piety with machismo and popular entertainment. Quranic recital is typically 
followed by performances of martial arts and highly risqué versions of dangdut where 
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members throw money at young female singers to gyrate or ‘drill dance’ (ngebor) in a 
sexually suggestive manner.57  Similarly, the violent behavior of gang members is 
portrayed as a moralistic intolerance of the violence of others. In a recent speech, the 
FBR leader, Fadloli, said: 
If they think that we are preman then it is clear that they do not understand 
the Betawi people.. it means they do not understand Betawi culture. ..It is 
clear that if we look around at all the disturbances going on in Jakarta, the 
preman involved are not Betawi... the FBR has been working to eliminate 
premanism for years, under the slogan ‘those who are smartarses - smash 
em!’.... If an uneducated person makes claims about FBR then explain the 
facts to them, but if an educated person, a smart one, no need to answer with 
words, answer em with a smack in the chops.58  
 
Behavior considered morally offensive to Islam is attributed by the FBR to outsiders. 
Like other militant Islamic groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front, the FBR has 
engaged in vigilante actions, attacking and closing down bars, pubs, clubs, gambling 
dens and centers for prostitution on the grounds that they threaten the moral fabric of 
the Betawi community.  Such assertions of moral outrage arise in the context of 
territorial disputes over protection rackets and in attempts to scare away non-Betawi 
from access to patronage. If a Betawi does indeed behave in an overtly criminal way, 
then this is depicted as alien to Betawi culture and to the FBR:  
 
I admit that some of our members behave badly at times and do strange 
things, but that’s no reason to slander the organization... The important thing 
is that up until now I have never seen an FBR member use his machete for 
criminal purposes. Have any of you seen FBR making bombs to terrorize 
foreign embassies? No! 
 
It doesn’t matter what accusations and slander are thrown against us as long 
as we stick to the Hadith and al-Quran59 
 
When Maduranese gangs and the FBR fought pitched street battles in the Cakung 
district of Jakarta in July 2002, over  control of the street vendors and parking next to 
the Cilincing toll road, Fadloli was attacked, but managed to escape serious injury.60 
Stories soon spread of Fadloli’s invulnerability to the blows from Maduranese 
machetes. For many this was interpreted as a sign that Fadloli had a God-ordained 
mandate to lead the Betawi. Like Si Pitung who survived numerous attempts by the 
Dutch to kill him, Fadloli had survived the attack of the new colonizers of Betawi 
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land. This story  has proved  a powerful recruiting tool, and in the months following 
Fadloli’s display of invulnerability. FBR membership increased rapidly.   
The authentication of Betawi ethnic identity has also focused on the claim to 
homeland ownership of a bounded territory. The justification for FBR activism is 
primarily that the state has hitherto failed to recognize the virtuous Betawi as the 
rightful indigenous owners of Jakarta. An extract from a FBR leaflet states: 
 
Oh Betawi sons and daughters, creating peace, tranquility and beauty in the 
Betawi land which has become the capital of Indonesia is our collective 
responsibility. Forgiving, always accommodating, not spiteful, prioritizing 
consensus, these are the characteristics of the Betawi. But, starting now, let’s 
rise up and unite the Betawi people to resist the migrants who are rude, 
arrogant, self-interested, spiteful and don’t respect and appreciate the Betawi 
indigenous people. We have had enough of sinfulness and barbarity, one 
drop of Betawi blood must be answered with an ocean of blood, and starting 
now lets make the Betawi jawara  in Betawi land. 
 
If we don’t work to change things, our children will be silenced just as we 
have been. But if we struggle, if we knock down this system, then maybe, 
just maybe, in the future we will achieve our vision of Betawi as jawara in 
their own neighborhood61 
 
The marginalization of the Betawi in Jakarta had engendered feelings of shame which 
were resolved by redefining the migrant community as the indigenous homeland 
community, by redefining the secular working class culture as the sacred 
ethnoreligious culture, and  by redefining  individualistic aggression as  the defense of 
the aggrieved community in pursuit of its righteous goals.   But this ressentiment 
reformulation is only sustainable as reaction to perceived threats, which accordingly 
must be exaggerated.  
 
THE TARGETING OF THE MADURANESE OTHER 
Betawi identity has been constructed as the virtuous Us, defined reactively against the 
exaggerated threat posed by migrants.  Javanese, the largest ethnic community (35%) 
in Jakarta, are identified by the Betawi primarily in non-ethnic terms, as  ‘Indonesian 
society’,  the state, the ‘system’, and in particular the ‘New Order’ whose corruption 
and criminality the Betawi accuse of having robbed them of their rightful resources 
and status. In a recent land dispute FBR leaders remarked that “all of this is a 
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consequence of the New Order government…the FBR is determined to take back our 
rights which were plundered by the New Order authorities”.62 However, it is the 
minority Maduranese community, comprising less than 1% of Jakarta’s population, 
who are the enemy against which the Betawi are mobilized.  
The targeting of the Maduranese migrant minority by the FBR might be 
initially thought to derive merely from the pragmatic calculation that violence against 
the weak Maduranese might be more likely to succeed than violence against the 
dominant Javanese; or from an irrational scapegoating of visible minorities as the 
cathartic targets for a diffuse rage. However, the Maduranese became the targets of 
FBR violence because they appeared to Betawi residents as the visible usurpers of 
Betawi rights, moving into localities claimed as Betawi homeland territory, but 
refusing to accept the legitimacy of FBR control over that territory. 
Both communities ostensibly share many common cultural elements, 
including nominal Islamic piety, a relatively egalitarian social structure, and a similar 
experience of being socially and politically marginalized. It should be noted that those 
migrants into Betawi neighborhoods, including Maduranese “who accept our values 
and way of life” and who recognize the legitimacy of FBR control,  have been 
accepted into the FBR. 
FBR violence is therefore directed not against all Maduranese, but against 
those who are resident in Betawi neighborhoods and appear to act like ‘preman’,  both 
in their refusal to accept Betawi claims to the right of control over their homeland 
territory, and in their adherence to  rival gangs. The demonized Maduranese are 
stereotyped as “migrants stealing or jobs and our land”.   
 
The problem with the Maduranese is that they stick together in groups, are 
stubborn, and when they finish a (work) contract they refuse to go back to 
their home. Instead they just set-up in our neighborhoods, take our jobs, our 
land and bring all their relatives to live with them! If it wasn’t for us showing 
our swords they would just take over the place! 63 
  
It is not of course only the Maduranese who support rival gangs, but FBR has focused 
upon the threat posed by Maduranese  since the 2002 tensions in Cakung, when both 
groups were claiming protection racket rights in the area. The FBR’s response was to 
explain this as not merely a turf war between rival gangs, a common occurrence in 
Jakarta, but as also a struggle for indigenous land rights.64  
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Once territory had become constructed as the indigenous homeland, it became 
a symbolically important issue for the FBR. The group has a legal team specifically 
focused upon filing claims for tenure based upon traditional Betawi ownership. The 
lack of documentation coupled with the unverifiable genealogies has meant that they 
have had little success. However this has merely fueled the ideological claim that the 
Betawi continue to be colonized in their own land, and reinforced the view that the 
system is hostile to the Betawi, so that it is only through direct action that their rights 
will be recognized.  
 
THE ‘STATE PROXY’ BASIS FOR VIOLENCE AND THE DUAL 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE 
It is the control of the state by the corrupt and criminal elements in Indonesian 
society, which explains both the lack of Betawi access to patronage, and the civic 
nationalist failings of the state. The state has fallen into the hands of corrupt 
individuals who are the ‘real’ preman; “preman wearing ties, preman wearing 
uniforms, those in the executive or the legislature, in the police and army”.65 So long 
as the Betawi felt themselves to be disempowered and marginalized, this  depiction of 
the state implied that the FBR could direct their violence against state targets. 
However, the impact of the ressentiment illusion of Betawi virtue, and of the resultant 
belief in the FBR’s territorial rights over their ethnic homeland, has been to generate a 
new sense of empowerment amongst the FBR, which allows them to construct 
themselves as a proxy state for the Betawi homeland, willing, if asked, to ally with a 
weakened Indonesian state unable to function without FBR help.  In this way, 
opposition to the state has become translated into alliance with the state. As one 
member explained, “If the government fulfilled its obligations and provided us with 
work, and satisfied our basic needs then there would be no reason for FBR to exist. As 
it stands, if we don’t stand up and fight for what is rightfully ours, we will end up with 
nothing”.   
Horowitz notes in his discussion of ethnic riots, that such conflict is 
characterized by “a view of violence as intended to inflict punishment of group 
wrongdoing that government should have inflicted but has failed to inflict”.66  If the 
state is corrupted so that it cannot perform its patronage and civic nationalist 
functions,  then the virtuous Us have the moral obligation to perform the state proxy 
role, maintaining order, promoting justice, and generating patronage resources, at 
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least within the territory of our own homeland. In this state-proxy role, individual 
self-interested aggrandizement is justified as a compensatory right of the betrayed 
ethnic minority community. The state-proxy logic implies the convergence of 
instrumental self interests and collective Betawi rights, in the use of ‘protection 
racket’ violence. 
The limited capacity of the Indonesian state to attain a monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force dates back to the late colonial period, and has been 
manifested both in the frequency with which army units have engaged in criminal 
activities, and also in the alliances between state agencies and criminal gangs which 
proliferated under Suharto’s New Order regime.67 During the late 1990s, however, the 
erosion of the state security apparatus led to the escalation of such alliances, aimed at 
“a system of shared power in the lower towns by splitting the territory up between the 
army , the police and the criminal world. Thus it brought about the delegation of some 
of the political surveillance mission to criminal urban gangs.”68  At the same time, 
some of the criminal gangs were seeking to legitimate their activities by making 
alliances with ethnolinguistic or ethnoreligious rights movements, resulting in gangs 
like the FBR. The concern of the state to ally with some gangs, thus coincided with 
the concern of some gangs to ally the state. 
The FBR ideology constructs the Betawi as virtuous by reactively contrasting 
them with the corruption of Indonesian society, and specifically of the state elites who 
have oppressed them by using the state to benefit themselves, showing contempt for 
Betawi rights. But the relationship can change if some members of the state-elite 
show respect to the Betawi by offering to ally with them. The FBR can then willingly 
accept such an alliance, in order to restore the state to its rightful role as the defender 
of Betawi rights.  This formulation means that the state is depicted in two ways in the 
FBR ideology- as the source of corruption and criminality which must be opposed; 
and as the source of authority which can confer security and respectability to the 
Betawi,  and which thus can be allied with.   FBR policies have sometimes combined 
both approaches, and thus give a pragmatic appearance to what has been in reality 
ideologically-driven. 
In order to illustrate this interplay (rather than dichotomy) between pragmatic 
flexibility and ideological rigidity, the shifting relationship between the FBR leader, 
Fadloli, and  the Javanese Governor of Jakarta, Sutiyoso, can be briefly outlined.69  
The FBR gained public notoriety when in March 2002, the group violently attacked a 
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demonstration organized by the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC). This Jakarta-based 
NGO protested against the forced removal of street vendors and launched a class 
action against Jakarta’s administration for failing to adequately assist flood victims. 
The attack by the FBR led to speculation in the media that the FBR were paid by 
Sutiyoso, the Javanese Governor of Jakarta, to intimidate critics of the city’s 
administration.  The FBR’s reason for the attack was that the UPC  was supporting the 
claims of the Betawi’s enemy, the Maduranese and other non-Betawi migrants 
resident in territory the FBR considered to be it’s own.  Seven FBR members were 
arrested over the attack,  but the FBR leader himself, Fadloli,  could not be arrested 
without the approval of the President, given his membership of the Supreme Advisory 
Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, or DPA).   When President Megawati refused 
to agree to his arrest, despite his continued public threats against the UPC’s leader, 
and despite a police request to investigate charges, it was widely assumed that 
Sutiyoso had protected Fadloli. This perhaps explains Fadloli’s public support of 
Megawati in her 2004 Presidential election campaign.70  
In 2002, when Sutisoyo campaigned for re-election as Jakarta’s Governor, the 
FBR gave him their support on the grounds that he “had demonstrated a concern for 
the Betawi people”, for example by his  closing of the Kramat Tunggek prostitution 
area, thereby cleaning Jakarta of the “immorality brought by migrants”. This was 
despite the fact that several Betawi candidates, forwarded by Bamus, were also in the 
running for the governorship. Sutiyoso won the election, with Bamus’s main 
candidate, Fauzi Bowo, being chosen as his deputy. However, Sutisoyo subsequently 
failed to reward the FBR for their support, rejecting their request for training 
facilities. Instead it was Fauzi Bowo, a fellow Betawi. who offered Fadloli the vacant 
deputy chairmanship of Bamus, a Betawi organization which he had previously 
rejected as too ‘elitist’. Fadloli accepted, since the position would give him a platform 
from which to attack the Governor, Sutisoyo, and would give more credibility to his 
claim to represent Betawi. 
This kind of political maneuvering is open to diverse interpretations.  At first 
sight it seems like unprincipled self-interested pragmatism.  Alternatively, it could be 
portrayed as indicating a linear shift from pragmatic political alliances across ethnic 
lines, towards a new ethnicization of political alignments. However, the FBR's quest 
for political advantage has been consistently based on one ideological formula; that 
the test of any potential ally, Javanese or Betawi (or even Maduranese), is their 
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willingness to give recognition to the FBR’s right to control the Betawi homeland 
territory. Javanese (and Maduranese) are distrusted and disregarded until they grant 
such recognition; while fellow-Betawi are esteemed, so long as they grant such 
recognition. 
 
THE SUCCESS OF THE STATE-PROXY STRATEGY 
The success of the ‘state-proxy’ strategy is evident in the growth of FBR control over  
‘its’ territory, its transformation from the status of delinquent preman gang to 
‘respectable’ quasi-official status, and the increased willingness of the state to enter 
into an alliance with an FBR which now has more capacity to control this area of 
Jakarta, than do the state agencies.  This is reflected in the change in the character of 
FBR violence, from ‘thug’ attacks to intimidatory ‘displays of force’. The 
development of the FBR’s alliance with the state is justified, for the Betawi, by the 
formulation that Betawi virtue will help the state free itself from the influence of 
corrupt preman. 
In the space of a few years the FBR has been successful in establishing 
relatively monopolistic control over the informal economy in significant areas of 
Jakarta, most notably the semi-industrial sections of East Jakarta such as Pulo 
Gadung, its stronghold in Cakung, and Pasar Senen.  Most racketeering gangs in 
Jakarta use coercive force and intimidation in order to secure money or resources on 
the pretext of offering ‘protection’ from a threat posed either by the gang themselves, 
or by their rivals. 71  FBR’s rationale for extracting regular payments from local 
businesses differs, since they argue that payment is their fundamental right, regardless 
of whether a ‘service’ such as protection is provided or not. The FBR claims 
exclusive economic and social rights as the representative of the indigenous 
community of Jakarta. Protection dues are considered legitimate taxes paid directly by 
business to the Betawi. The language used in an extortion letter sent to a local 
business is revealing: 
With this letter we request the assistance of your business in providing a 
routine monthly donation to help cover FBR’s operational costs. If you 
choose to disregard this request then we will assume that you do not care 
about the aspirations or welfare of the Betawi people as the indigenous 
population of Jakarta. This being the case, we, the Betawi Brotherhood 




Those reluctant to pay are labeled as outsiders antagonistic to the welfare of the 
Betawi community. The FBR also invokes a legal as well as a moral basis for 
pressuring businesses to employ their members, referring to Regional Regulation 
No.2 which states that businesses are obliged to offer work to local and indigenous 
people in the region in which they operate.  
According to one FBR official: 
the government has failed to either implement or enforce this regulation in 
Jakarta, as a result we have been forced to do so ourselves. We don’t wish to 
take over the role of the police, but we have been left with no choice. 73 
FBR’s 2004 annual report lists as ‘successes’ businesses that have employed its 
members after being pressured. Those who refuse are picketed and systematically 
harassed. The ITC Cempaka Mas shopping mall had its entrance blockaded for 
several days after it turned down job applications from several FBR members. The 
long-term strategy of this approach, yet to be realized, is to create a situation where 
the number of FBR employees is sufficient that they can exercise a degree of control 
over the business. The major obstacle has been the fact that FBR members generally 
have low levels of education, meaning they are employed in the bottom tier of jobs, as 
security, cleaners or parking attendants.  
Members also have access to other services that would otherwise be beyond 
their reach, including legal representation, ambulance services, subsidized health care, 
assistance in life-cycle rituals such as circumcisions, wedding and funerals, and a 
publishing house. The children of deceased members are adopted by Fadloli and 
placed in his two orphanages. The FBR also has a rapid-response team, consisting of 
members highly trained in martial arts, who are on call to assist any members who get 
into trouble.  Equipped with minivans complete with sirens and flashing lights, it is 
boasted that, traffic permitting, they can respond to a distress call with 30 minutes. 
Affiliation provides protection. A recent anti-preman campaign conducted throughout 
Jakarta by the police saw up to 500 members joining FBR each week.  Membership 
alone was sufficient to avoid the police dragnet.  
The organizational backbone of the FBR is its gardu structure of small security 
posts, usually situated near intersections, markets or bus terminals. Currently the FBR 
has approximately 185 gardu spread throughout the greater Jakarta region, with the 
highest concentration being in Cakung. Emulating the territorial command structure 
of the Indonesian military as well as the pos siskamling neighborhood surveillance 
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system setup by the New Order in the 1990’s, individual gardu are coordinated by a 
district commander who in turn reports directly to FBR’s central board.74  Gardu are 
led by a coordinator and an advisory council, who are given a mandate by the central 
leadership to seek funds and take action against drug traffickers, alcohol vendors and 
entertainment venues considered immoral.   
One of the main roles of the FBR therefore, has been to establish itself as a 
quasi-state in the traditional Betawi homeland areas of East and Central Jakarta. “We 
work with the police, army and government as long as it doesn’t conflict with Sharia... 
We are ready to join together with the police and the army to eliminate preman”.75 
This involves not just the policing of the area, but also the employment of state 
paraphernalia and symbolism- uniforms, sirens, motorcycle escorts:   
 
Fadloli [FBR leader] announced he was leaving for another appointment. 
Members rushed forward to kiss his hand, forming a guard of honor as he 
moved to his black sedan, escorted by the ‘general’ (in pseudo military 
uniform with three general stars on his lapel, and reflective sunglasses) and 
his other personal security guard.... Two FBR motorbikes, imitation Harleys 
with police sirens attached, led Fadloli’s motorcade, in the fashion of 
government ministers.... A lead bike stopped traffic. Cars that were slow to 
get out of the way were swiftly kicked and abused.  The odd police officer in 
the street looked somewhat bemused, but certainly not concerned.76 
It is thus the state-proxy formulation, in the ideology of the FBR, which reconciles 
individualistic pragmatism and  collectivist moral absolutism.  If the state has failed to 
perform its legitimate role of  giving all citizens an equal chance, and has betrayed the 
ethnic Us,  then the ethnic Us must legitimately seek recompense for the injustices 
done to it.  Each member of this victimized ethnic community has been discriminated 
against, so that any measures they take for individual self-aggrandizement, are merely 
just recompense for the collective injustice which has been done to the ethnic 
collectivity. It is this search for material benefits, perceived and depicted as ethnic 
rights, which generates most of the violence in which the FBR is involved. The fact 
that FBR has previously employed violence in order to attain dominance in its home 
territory, means, however, that ‘shows of force’ are now often sufficient to achieve 
the desired ends: 
Seeing the approaching FBR mob (about 200 motorbikes), vendors at the 
market panicked, quickly grabbing what they could and running towards the 
park behind them.  FBR yelled out that they weren’t here to make a problem, 
and asked the vendors to go get the man who ‘held’ the market. It turned out 
this was a takeover bid...The FBR guys outlined what they wanted – to set up 
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a gardu at the market, to be paid as security, and for vendors to join FBR. In 
return they would ensure the area was ‘safe’, as well as deal with public 
order officers... While it had the outward appearance of a ‘reasonable’ 
discussion, the man was clearly highly nervous and was not in any real 
position to negotiate.  The vendors stayed back inside their stalls, represented 
only by their man. He looked much outnumbered... He agreed, and soon after 
the FBR guys up and left, leaving behind a FBR flag, and clearly satisfied  
and buoyed by the ease with which they had claimed new turf. A public 
order van became an object of their sense of power, getting its rear vision 
mirrors ripped off and doors kicked in.77 
 
 Criminal behaviour is thus experienced by gang members, as both legitimate policing 
and an assertion of Betawi indigenous rights. To the extent that the FBR consider that 
they have begun to achieve ‘respectability’ as a partner with the state, then they can 
begin to take pride in Indonesian civic nationalism. In August 2005 FBR was at the 
forefront of demonstrations against Malaysia over its territorial dispute with Indonesia 
regarding the sovereignty of Ambalat Island, situated of the east coast of Borneo.78 In 
a speech at FBR headquarters after a demonstration Fadloli said provocatively “it’s 
lucky that we do love Indonesia, because otherwise with our numbers we could really 
stir things up!”79 The FBR has also demonstrated civic responsibility by volunteering 
to provide security for Jakarta’s churches during the Christmas period of 2005-2006 
when concerns were high regarding the possibility of terrorist attacks, though some 
commentators suggested that this was a strategic move to gain credibility amongst the 
affluent Chinese Christian community. This contrasted with their earlier involvement 
in the forced closing of several churches in Jakarta in 2002.  Recently the FBR has 
aligned itself with conservative and hard-line Islamic groups via its outspoken public 
support of the proposed anti-pornography bill.80 The FBR argues that the bill is 
crucial for protecting the moral fabric of not just the Betawi community, but also the 
nation. 81  
Our nationalist spirit is unquestioned, the territorial integrity of the republic 
of Indonesia is something we are prepared to die for. 82 
 
CONCLUSION 
Intra-state violence is sometimes depicted as arising from the pragmatic pursuit of 
self-interests by marginalized individuals, in situations where the state has failed to 
provide the kind of legal, social and political framework which successful capitalist 
development requires. The justification of such violence in the language of 
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ethnolinguistic, ethnoreligious or nationalist rights, is then portrayed as merely the 
hypocritical camouflaging for rational self-interests.  Alternatively, such political 
violence can be understood as arising from the failure of the state to legitimate itself 
as the focal point of the moral community of the nation, so that anomic individuals 
seek recourse in morally absolutist commitments to ethnonationalist or ethnoreligious 
visions of community. Violence ensues from the emotive clash between such 
communitarian claims, which the fragmented state fails to reconcile. The tension 
between these two depictions of ethnicized violence rests on an acceptance of the 
dichotomy between the rational and the irrational. Even if we see that each strand of 
explanation can contribute partial illumination, this dichotomy means that the attempt 
to combine the two approaches might seem to generate not synthesis, but conceptual 
incoherence.  
The dichotomy is challenged, however, by the ressentiment formulation. 
Ressentiment arises from an impulse to rationality, in that it derives from the attempt 
by those experiencing moral and cognitive confusion, to find a rational and internally 
consistent explanation for their marginalization, by locating the cause of their 
disempowerment in political oppression, depicting this as an injustice, and providing 
a route towards action and empowerment. Ressentiment achieves this by its 
simplification of social complexities, so as to identify one victim community, one 
agency of oppression, and one target for action. It is the element of illusion in this 
exaggeration and stereotyping which allows the logic of ressentiment to become the 
vehicle for the non-rational moral absolutisms – the sanctified Us versus the 
demonized Other- so as to resolve the emotions unleashed by anomie. Ressentiment 
thus has, at its core, a rational dimension, albeit one which is “partial and faulty”; it is 
motivated by the concern to restore a sense of self-worth, and to do so by constructing 
an argument which is internally consistent and which derives from a search for a 
“sense of fairness, justice [and] proper balance”83.  The gulf between the irrational 
and the rational is narrowed, albeit not fully bridged, by the ressentiment process. 
Such an explanation of the consciousness of those who perpetrate ethnicized 
violence, in this case the Betawi Brotherhood Forum, corresponds with the 
explanation of the external factors which, in this particular case, engendered the 
ressentiment consciousness.  The Hobbesian model of the strong state was one which 
provided a stable political framework so as to remove the physical and material 
insecurities and unpredictabilities which engendered violence; and which provided the 
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basis for the development of a sense of political community (the incipient nation) 
amongst those governed by, and having faith in, the state. It is this combination of 
material security and civic nationalist trust that is threatened by the fragmentation of 
the state. The loss of physical security and predictability in access to resources, and 
the loss of faith in progress towards the nationalist promise of civic equality, was not 
complete in post-1998 Indonesia, but it was sufficient to evoke a dual disillusionment 
in variously downwardly mobile groups- who experienced the fall of Suharto both as 
an increased uncertainty of access to material resources, and as an intensified 
exclusion from the brief euphoria of civic optimism.  Ethnicized violence is only one 
possible response to such circumstances, and to the ressentiment they engender, since 
it requires resources and opportunities not available to all marginalized groups. Its 
explanation thus requires, as here, an interplay between the development of a 
conceptual framework, and the description of a specific case. The meeting of fanatics 
and criminals is contingent, but it is not incoherent. 
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